Permissionless cloud and zero-trust applications

Evidence level: mixed. The forwarding plane, hop GB metering, mailbox ciphertext store, and fragment APIs are live. Storage, WASM / container, and GPU work that a given node actually offers is deployment-specific. Decentralized AI is an application composition, not a shipped L0 product.

Layer Minus is a permissionless, decentralized cloud. Anyone may use it. Anyone may join by offering resources. Developers build privacy-first applications on top of it. They must assume that any one node can be malicious.

What the cloud is

Layer Minus is not a licensed SaaS and not a single operator’s data center. It is a shared infrastructure of independent CoNET-SI nodes on the public Internet. Participants contribute one or more of:

Resource What the node does Why it is paid
Network forward Carry OpenPGP armor toward a mailbox or next hop Metered forwarded bytes → GB
Storage Hold ciphertext fragments, mailbox offline armor, or sealed indexes Useful retention and retrieval, not custody of plaintext
CPU / GPU compute Run a signed job (storage command, WASM / container, inference helper) Work the client can verify without trusting the host

The reward asset for DePIN service is GB (GBToken on CoNET L1). Forwarding is the live, byte-metered path. Storage and compute settlement follow the same rule: pay for useful ciphertext work, never for reading user plaintext.

Use of the plane is permissionless. A developer does not apply to CoNET to send Chat, store fragments, or schedule a job. A user does not need an account issued by a node operator.

The public Guardian roster is a discovery set, not a license. GuardianNodesInfoV6.getAllNodes is what current clients use to find domains and route keys. Adding a row with addNode today requires adminList. That is an L1 admission fact for the listed set. It does not make Layer Minus a permissioned application platform, and it does not make a listed node trusted. See Guardian nodes and Participate in mining.

Zero trust: any node may be malicious

Treat every Layer Minus node as an untrusted host:

  • it may drop, delay, or replay traffic;
  • it may log client IPs, sizes, and times;
  • it may lie about storage or compute results;
  • it may collude with other nodes.

L0 therefore must not require any node to see business plaintext. A/B/C roles, user-PGP encryption, and hop-sig metering are the live forwarding expression of that rule. They are not a promise that a node is honest.

Do not trust a node with
  ├─ message text, files, or model inputs in the clear
  ├─ a reconstructable whole object
  ├─ the only copy of a secret
  └─ an unverified compute result

Trust only
  ├─ keys the client holds
  ├─ ciphertext the client can re-encrypt or re-split
  └─ results the client can verify or recompute

Collusion of A+B or C+B still binds a wallet to an IP. Distinct Guardian addresses are not an operator-domain proof. See security limits.

How developers compose a privacy-first application

A privacy-first app is not “pick one honest node.” It is a combination of techniques so that a single malicious node cannot read, reconstruct, or silently rewrite the user’s work.

Technique What it does Live anchors
Privacy routing Sender and listener do not dial mailbox B. Nested PGP can hide the inner key ID from the first hop. Routing and product wallets may be different EOAs. Mailbox routing, hop-sigs, split wallets
Data fragmentation Split ciphertext so no node holds a reconstructable whole. Store fragments by hash. Keep the assembly index encrypted to keys the client (or authorized set) controls. IPFS storageFragment / getFragment; Chat history index; copyright / DCDN designs
Client-side cryptography Encrypt to the recipient user PGP (or a session key that B never sees). Sign application objects. Verify compute outputs. How to use L0, SI developer guide
Other application policy Split routing / payment identities, consumed nonces, sealed indexes, multi-node reconstruction, challenge windows Application-owned. Not an L0 header field 
Privacy-first application
  ├─ privacy routing     (A ≠ B, C ≠ B, optional outer wrap, optional routing wallet)
  ├─ fragmentation       (no single node has the whole object)
  └─ other client crypto (encrypt, sign, verify)
        │
        ▼
Layer Minus nodes  (forward / store / compute — all untrusted)
        │
        ▼
Privacy-first surfaces
  communications · storage · compute · decentralized AI

Application surfaces

These are what developers build. They are not extra L0 protocols.

Surface Composition Do not
Communications User-PGP Chat, typed control messages, UDP frames, SilentPass egress Give mailbox B business plaintext or a UDP Securitykey
Storage Encrypted fragments + sealed index; mailbox only stores armor it cannot read Put a reconstructable file on one node in the clear
Compute Send a sealed job to one or more nodes (WASM / container / GPU). Verify the result or use redundancy Treat the host’s stdout as truth
Decentralized AI Private prompts and weights as fragments; inference as untrusted compute; results returned encrypted to the user Upload a model or prompt in the clear to “the AI node”

Chat, SilentPass, fragment history, and hop GB are the current production building blocks. Bulk DCDN, copyright delivery, and a general GPU / AI marketplace remain application designs on the same zero-trust cloud. Document them as compositions, not as automatic SI policy.

What this page does not claim

  • A listed Guardian is honest.
  • Running an unlisted SI automatically appears in getAllNodes.
  • Every node offers GPU or WASM.
  • Fragmentation by itself is anonymity.
  • Decentralized AI is a live CoNET product name.

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