Decentralized cross-chain Treasury

Evidence level: mixed. The deployed TreasuryBridgeV3 proxy and its canonical CoNET assets are production references. The bridge policy, quorum, and replay controls are implemented capabilities. The hand-off from a bridged asset into CoNET-DLE remains a normative design and is not a production L2 service.

Public site: https://gitbook.conet.network/l1/cross-chain-treasury.html

Purpose

An ERC-20 issued on another chain is not automatically a CoNET asset. Its source-chain contract, supply, decimals, finality, and custody model all belong to a different trust domain.

The CoNET Treasury provides an explicit cross-chain boundary:

  1. an approved route locks or burns value on the source chain;
  2. a miner quorum attests one exact operation;
  3. the destination Treasury mints or releases the configured asset representation once; and
  4. CoNET applications use the resulting canonical CoNET ERC-20.

This separates asset custody and supply conservation from relaying. A relayer can carry evidence, but it does not receive an unrestricted right to mint.

Production anchors

There is one production Treasury: TreasuryBridgeV3. Older CREATE2 / BaseTreasury / ConetTreasury addresses are deprecated and must not be documented as a second Treasury.

Component Address Role
TreasuryBridgeV3 proxy 0xa208982212978550594A7FEEB70a61665d129003 Sole Treasury: route policy, quorum, mint, burn, lock, and release on CoNET and Base
ConetTreasuryPeer v4 0x6093871d8a3EE6EaADc9869451D1693973cFBCC0 Peer module for registered burn/mint and configured swaps — not a second Treasury
conet-USDC 0x5209865D404aA5646eDe5B91CD4218909eA72eDA Treasury-canonical six-decimal settlement asset
GBToken (GB) 0xC3EF02DaE632b4C10abB66e07d92a387c10838D8 Active nine-decimal DePIN service asset
Base USDC 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 Current source-chain USDC for LockMint and product top-up paths

TreasuryBridgeV3 is an ERC-1967/UUPS proxy. Its stable address does not imply immutable logic: upgrade authority, miner-roster administration, route configuration, and token roles remain part of the trust and governance boundary.

The current production counterpart chain is Base (chainId 8453). That is a governed CoNET ↔ Base route on the same V3 Treasury, not a permissionless bridge and not a second Treasury contract. ConetTreasuryPeer bytecode is present on CoNET L1 at the address above; do not assume the same Peer address is deployed on Base without checking eth_getCode.

Three explicit route modes

Every route binds the source chain, source Treasury, source asset, destination asset, mode, decimals, enabled state, and policy version.

Mode Source-side action Destination-side action Typical use
BurnMint Burn an authorized source representation Mint the configured destination representation Canonical assets whose supply can be reduced on the source chain
LockMint Lock the source asset in Treasury custody Mint a representation on the destination chain Foreign assets that cannot be burned by the bridge
BurnRelease Burn the destination representation Release previously locked source assets Reverse leg of a lock-and-mint route

A token address supplied by a caller does not create a route. The route must already be configured and enabled, and the Treasury must hold the required mint, burn, or custody authority.

Miner-governed operation flow

user-authorized source operation
        │
        ▼
configured Treasury route
        │  emits one operationId-bound payload
        ▼
independent source observation
        │
        ▼
destination miner votes / sorted attestations
        │  threshold = ceil(2N / 3)
        ▼
execute exactly once
        │
        ├── mint configured destination asset
        └── or release configured reserve

The operation identity commits to the source and destination chains, Treasuries and assets, route mode, beneficiaries, exact amounts, source transaction hash, nonce, fee, and optional callback. The destination contract:

  • rejects a route that is not enabled;
  • rejects conflicting payloads for the same operation;
  • accepts at most one vote per miner;
  • requires the configured quorum;
  • verifies that beneficiary amounts sum to the gross amount; and
  • consumes operationExecuted[operationId] before distribution, preventing replay.

These controls decentralize authorization across the configured miner set. They do not prove that every miner is operationally independent, that source-chain finality cannot reorganize, or that governance and upgrade keys cannot be compromised.

Onboarding an ERC-20 from another chain

The architecture can admit ERC-20s from supported chains, but admission is policy-driven, not automatic, and not permissionless. A caller-supplied token address does not create a route. Current product paths use pre-registered assets such as Base USDC, conet-USDC, GB, and B-Unit. A route needs all of the following:

  1. Source identity — exact source chainId, token contract, decimals, and finality policy.
  2. Custody modeLockMint, BurnMint, and any reverse BurnRelease path must conserve exact raw token units.
  3. Canonical CoNET representation — a stable CoNET token address with bounded mint/burn roles and a documented upgrade policy.
  4. Treasury policy — the exact route and version must be approved and enabled by the configured governance path.
  5. Replay domain — operation IDs, nonces, source transaction hashes, and destination execution state must be unique.
  6. Relayer and miner availability — enough independent observers must verify source finality and reach destination quorum.
  7. Exit capacity — a lock route must retain reserves; a burn/mint route must preserve replacement authority and supply accounting.
  8. Application admission — wallets, explorers, indexers, and applications must recognize the canonical CoNET address rather than the foreign address.

Until those conditions are met, “bridging any ERC-20 to CoNET” is not a safe or supported operation.

From a bridged ERC-20 to CoNET-DLE

The intended user journey is:

ERC-20 on a supported external chain
        │
        │ configured Treasury operation
        ▼
Treasury-canonical ERC-20 on CoNET L1
        │
        ├── usable by enabled CoNET L1 applications
        │
        └── optional DLE admission
                 │ exact proxy/version
                 │ approved pool + TWAP adapter
                 │ minimum liquidity + fresh quote
                 │ AssetAdmissionRegistry = ACTIVE
                 │ AssetBurnMintGateway safety gates
                 ▼
          parallel DLE asset tips

The first transition is a cross-chain Treasury operation. The second is a separate L1-to-L2 admission and burn/activation protocol. They use different operation IDs, fees, finality rules, and failure recovery.

Once a CoNET representation has passed the future DLE admission gates, the target architecture can give it access to:

  • event-driven asset ledgers that progress independently;
  • parallel capacity across archive shards rather than one global application queue;
  • value-bounded asset tips with a frozen 100-USDC-equivalent per-tip safety ceiling;
  • wallet-addressed L0 coordination for private order and notification traffic; and
  • class-specific settlement, including future miner-assisted markets.

This DLE transition is not live today. Bridging into CoNET L1 does not by itself create an asset tip, activate L2 backing, or prove that the required pool, oracle, gateway, archive, and economic release gates have passed.

Security boundary

Risk Required control
Unauthorized mint Explicit route policy, bounded token roles, quorum verification, and single-use operation IDs
Double execution Destination replay protection and payload-hash equality
Source-chain reorganization Route-specific finality depth before miner attestation
Reserve shortfall Verifiable locked reserves or replacement-capacity accounting
Decimal or asset mismatch Exact raw-unit accounting and route-bound source/destination addresses
Miner collusion or censorship Independent operators, transparent roster and quorum, monitoring, dispute and recovery procedures
Upgrade or owner compromise Governed upgrades, delayed administration, key isolation, public verification, and emergency controls
Oracle or liquidity failure No DLE admission without a versioned pool/TWAP adapter, minimum liquidity, and fresh observations

No bridge can remove all cross-chain trust. CoNET's design makes route authority, operation data, quorum, and replay state explicit so they can be verified and constrained.

DLE maturity boundary

The deployed Treasury primitives are necessary but not sufficient for production DLE asset ingress. The DLE specification additionally requires a dedicated AssetBurnMintGateway, replacement-capacity reservation, pending-burn activation or refund, normal and challenged exits, cumulative conservation accounting, and formal release gates.

See Cross-chain assets in CoNET-DLE for that second boundary.

Source anchors

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